There’s a great deal of debate online about whether there was a moral imperative to remove the “evil” Ayatollah and his regime, even if the American-Israeli attack was clearly illegal under international law.
Legally, the case is weak. The UN Charter is explicit: the use of force is prohibited except in self-defense against an armed attack or when authorized by the UN Security Council. There was no imminent attack underway, nor a credible case of anticipatory self-defense under the narrow standards traditionally accepted in international law. “Regime change,” whether implicit or explicit, directly violates the foundational principle of state sovereignty — the core organizing rule of the post-1945 international system.
However uncomfortable it may be, even Iran retains the sovereign right to develop the means it believes necessary for its own defense. Many states possess advanced military capabilities without triggering preemptive war. The threshold for lawful force is intentionally high because the consequences of miscalculation are catastrophic.
I would argue that this attack represents the most damaging blow to the rules-based international system since Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine. Ironically, it hands Putin rhetorical ammunition. When major powers circumvent international law in the name of security or morality, they weaken their own ability to condemn others for doing the same. This is why Canada's and Australia's support of the attack on Iran becomes problematic.
But what about the moral imperative? What about the argument that the Iranian people — who rose up in protest and were met with lethal force — needed outside help to be “liberated” from a brutal regime?
This is where the dilemma becomes far more serious. It places the bedrock principle of sovereignty in direct conflict with the moral impulse to prevent suffering. The doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), endorsed in 2005, was designed to address precisely this tension. It holds that when a state is unwilling or unable to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, or crimes against humanity, the international community has a responsibility to act.
But R2P was never intended to authorize unilateral regime change. It explicitly channels coercive force through collective mechanisms — primarily the UN Security Council. Without broad international consensus, intervention risks becoming indistinguishable from aggression cloaked in humanitarian language.
The real challenge is determining when the line has truly been crossed. “Evil” is not a legal category; it is a moral judgment. If powerful states can unilaterally define when another government is sufficiently immoral to justify war, then the prohibition on force collapses into subjectivity. Every great power believes its cause is righteous. That is precisely why the system was designed to remove unilateral moral conviction as a trigger for war.
We saw the difficulty of this balance during the Balkan wars of the 1990s — in Bosnia and Herzegovina and later in Kosovo. The international response evolved gradually: sanctions, peacekeeping, diplomacy, and eventually military intervention. Even then, especially in Kosovo, the action was described by some as “illegal but legitimate.” That phrase itself reveals the fragility of the order. When legitimacy drifts away from legality, the guardrails weaken.
History also forces us to confront another uncomfortable truth: externally imposed regime change often produces prolonged instability rather than liberation. Power vacuums invite factionalism. Regional actors intervene. Proxy conflicts proliferate. The moral clarity that justified intervention at the outset quickly dissolves into unintended consequences borne by civilians.
None of this diminishes the suffering of the Iranian people. It does not deny the brutality of their government. It simply recognizes that the method of response matters. Sanctions, diplomatic isolation, support for civil society, documentation of human rights abuses, and international legal accountability are slower and less dramatic tools — but they preserve the architecture of restraint that prevents global politics from devolving into open-ended power struggles.
Our instinct is to seek simple moral binaries — good versus evil, liberation versus tyranny. That works in the movies. In geopolitics, the landscape is far more complex. The road to hell is often paved with good intentions, and once force is unleashed it isn't neatly contained.
Putin implausibly framed his invasion of Ukraine as self-defense and protection. Most of us see it as imperial ambition. It becomes difficult to maintain moral clarity if other powerful states adopt similar language to justify actions that sidestep international law. The standard cannot be elastic depending on who is wielding power.
If the rules-based order is to mean anything, it must apply even when it is inconvenient, especially when it is inconvenient. Otherwise, “moral imperative” becomes not a principle, but a pretext.
And once that line is blurred, it is not only one regime or one region that suffers. It is the stability of the entire international system — a system that, however imperfect, has constrained great-power war for nearly eight decades, and is now being shredded, with reprecussions we have yet to fully understand.