The Messianic Agenda

For some time now, I’ve been circling an uncomfortable idea: that elements within Israel’s current leadership are not just indifferent to the condition of Jews in the diaspora—but may, in a deeper ideological sense, see their deterioration as useful.

Call it, for lack of a better term, the Messianic Agenda.

To be clear, I don’t believe Benjamin Netanyahu wakes up in the morning plotting how to make life harder for Jews in Montreal, London, or New York. His explicit project is to permanently foreclose the possibility of a two-state solution and consolidate Israeli control over Palestinian land. That much is visible in policy, in coalition choices, and in political instinct.

But Netanyahu does not govern alone. He sits atop a coalition that includes figures like Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir, for whom politics and theology are not separate spheres. In their worldview, history is not just something to be managed—it is something to be fulfilled.

And within that worldview lies the ancient idea of the ingathering of exiles: that Jews will ultimately return to the land of Israel as a precondition for redemption.

You don’t have to stretch very far to see the implication. If Jews are comfortable, secure, and integrated in the diaspora, why would they leave? But if life becomes precarious—if antisemitism rises, if belonging begins to fray—then aliyah is no longer an abstract ideal. It becomes a necessity.

I am not suggesting a coordinated policy to export instability. That would be too crude, too conspiratorial.

What I am suggesting is something subtler and, in its own way, more troubling: a governing ethos that is perfectly willing to absorb, perhaps even quietly validate, the consequences of its actions on diaspora Jews, because those consequences align with a deeper religious and ideological current.

If Jews abroad become targets of anger toward Israel, that is regrettable. But it also reinforces the core Zionist claim in its religious-nationalist form that Jewish life outside Israel is ultimately untenable.

This marks a profound break from the Zionism many of us in the diaspora grew up with.

In the 20th century, Zionism was a partnership. Israel was fragile, resource-poor, and dependent. Diaspora Jews, especially in North America, provided capital, expertise, and political cover. We did so not out of religious conviction, but out of historical memory and cultural attachment. Israel was not where we had to live. It was the place that ensured we would could live anywhere without worry, because we always have somewhere to go if we had to.

I remember that ethos vividly.

As a child, I would paste small paper leaves onto a cardboard tree at school, each one representing a modest donation to the Jewish National Fund. Some kids were enthusiastic about it, filling tree after tree with leaves. There was always competition to see who could make the most trees. I wasn`t one of those kids. My tree looked as bare as the onset of winter. It was a source of some shame and embarrassment. 

I have a black and white photograph of my grandfather Sam from the early 1960s. He stands with a group of men around a woman, her hair covered with a kerchief, at a sewing machine. He is inspecting the way two swatches of fabric were sewn together with the practiced eye of a master in his field. As one of Canada's most successful garment manufacturers, grandpa Sam had been invited by the Prime Minister of Israel himself, to help develop the country`s fledgling textile industry. That, too, was Zionism: practical, collaborative, outward-looking.

That version of Zionism assumed a strong, confident diaspora as a permanent feature of Jewish life. A partner in state-building.

Today’s version is different. It is more insular, more absolutist, and more overtly theological. It does not look to the diaspora as a partner so much as a population in waiting.

At the same time, the environment for Jews outside Israel is becoming more volatile. Social media is becoming saturated with conspiracy theories that would not have felt out of place in The Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Old tropes—of secret control, of blood libel, of dual loyalty—have returned with modern packaging and algorithmic amplification.

Some of this is tied to Israel’s recent actions. America's involvement in the war with Iran has become a lightning rod for antisemitic conspiracy. 

Some of it is opportunistic. The internet doing what it does best: flattening distinctions and rewarding outrage.

But the result is the same. The line between criticism of Israel and hostility toward Jews is increasingly blurred, and diaspora communities are left to absorb the consequences.

Here is the paradox.

The more exposed diaspora Jews feel, the more Israel can present itself as indispensable. And the more indispensable it becomes, the less incentive its leaders have to moderate policies that contribute to that exposure in the first place.

This is not a conspiracy. It is a feedback loop, one that does not require anyone to consciously design it in order to benefit from it.

The tragedy is that it risks eroding something that took generations to build: a relationship between Israel and the diaspora rooted not in fear, but in mutual investment and shared purpose.

What replaces it may be something narrower, more coercive, and ultimately more fragile—a Zionism that depends not on the flourishing of Jewish life everywhere, but on its contraction.

The 21st century version of Zionism increasingly pursues a Messianic Agenda. The ingathering of the nations is always in the background. 

For Jews who don't relate to that Israel, our ancestral homeland risks losing its meaning and importance. 

Worse, when the Israeli government makes moves that don`t consider the international consequences, diaspora Jews feeling increasingly at risk, may understandably turn against it. And that is regrettable.   

The Woman I Need

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The woman I need has seen a few things,

The woman I need has seen a few things,

You know the woman I need has seen a few things,

A woman with heart and a spirit that sings.

Some women shine like a lightning flash,

Some women shine like a lightning flash,

Some women shine like a lightning flash,

You know the woman I need is like a thunderclap.

Some women are the kind that just want to please,

Some women are the kind that just want to please,

Some women are the kind that just want to please,

You know the woman I need, she ain't so easy.

Some women are breezy, light as a leaf,

Some women are breezy, light as a leaf,

Some women are breezy, light as a leaf,

The woman I need is like a chestnut tree.

Some women cry the world done them wrong.

Some women cry the world done them wrong.

Some women cry the world done them wrong.

You know the woman I need the world's made her strong.

The woman I need has weathered the storm,

The woman I need has weathered the storm,

The woman I need has weathered the storm,

A woman, like me, a little battle worn.

The Hockey Analogy

It’s that time of year once again. The NHL playoffs. And this year the Habs (what we locals affectionately call the Montreal Canadiens) made it into the playoffs even before the last week of the season. 

That used to be a given back when I was a teenager in the 70s. But it hasn’t been the case for decades.

I’m not saying the Habs are a contender for the cup. They’re a young exciting team. Still rebuilding. But they have grit and seem to be on the right track. They might win a round or two. 

Hockey was on my mind when the crew of bar-mitzvah bochers sporting their miniature 1940s-style fedoras showed up at my office for their weekly attempt to get me to wrap tefillin (phylacteries).

I usually oblige because I love to see the smiles on their smooth, pre-adolescent faces. Then they give me their religious shpiel, memorized from the weekly Torah portion. Some pearl of wisdom from the sages that their teacher taught them to recite. As if these barely pubescent kids could teach me something I didn't already know. It's cute as hell, and I give them plenty of attention.

Every once in a while I'll slip in a code they'll understand. A Yiddishism, or a reference to a Talmudic sage, so they know who they're dealing with, and they don't completely embarrass themselves.

Fact is I love them for their optimism and enthusiasm. 

Today the crew comprised, Yisroel, Lavy and Menachem Mendel. 

Yisroel is the serious one. Clearly the most learned of the bunch. Hungry to both share his knowledge and learn something new. Lavy just wants to get on with the business at hand and earn his mitzvah points; wisdom shmisdom, time is money. Menachem Mendel is a combination of the other two. He’s got big glasses and looks like he hasn’t graduated from elementary school yet. He’s a lot smarter and more mature than he looks, and knows his Torah. 

On this particular Friday I was in rare form; jocular and avuncular. I decided early on that I was going to turn the tables on them in a lighthearted way. Knew also that I was going to wrap, say the Shema, and drop a few coins in their pushke to make them feel the visit was a win.

Lavy and Menachem Mendel took off shortly after I did the dirty deed and exacted my price, gave them a parting shot by telling them not to get overly excited by all this superstitious nonsense. Yisroel stayed behind to further nourish my soul with his learned words.

He furrowed his brow and looked up to the sky (the cheap suspended ceiling tile), searching for spiritual guidance and inspiration. 

Then he said: This week's Torah portion we read that when Aaron's two sons, Nadav and Avihu, died suddenly because they had committed an avera in the Temple, a transgression against Hashem, Moses consoled his brother in his time of grief. And from this we learn that in life there will be eventualities we cannot comprehend, and it is by comforting each other that we will find the strength to endure such difficulties. 

And that's when I talked hockey, being certain that like every Canadian kid with a pulse - even ones who wear wholesale, undersized, rabbit-fur fedoras - he's a Habs fan.

'Why would G-d want us to endure such grief as losing a child?' I asked him.

'Unfortunately it happens,' he answered. 'We have to learn to accept the incomprehensible sometimes. And the strength to do so comes from realizing we are not unique. All human beings suffer.'

'Fair enough. So why do we differentiate ourselves? Why do we think we have some 'chosen' status?' 

'Because we were given the responsibility of Torah.'

'Okay, but you say that we learn that Moses comforted his brother who suffered an incomprehensible tragedy. Isn’t grief and suffering universal?'

'Yes.'

'Look I get it. We have our traditions, others groups have theirs. There is comfort in that. But you agree that we all experience tragedies we can’t understand. And it's human connection that provides comfort.' 

Now he's listening.

'What I mean is this. You and I grew up in Montreal. We're Habs fans. G-d forbid if we cheer for the Bruins. We love our team. And there's nothing wrong with that. We want them to win. It makes us feel good. When they lose we get mad. I feel the same way about being Jewish.’

He smiles.

'But in the grand scheme of things, it's just hockey. A game. A bunch of made-up rules. The game favours some types of people who have the skills and character to play it well. The rest of us have to watch from the sidelines and enjoy. But it's all arbitrary and artificial. It has no meaning or real value. It’s just a game.

How is that any different than society as whole? A bunch of made-up rules we follow. A game we play. Some better at it than others. The better ones get rich. The ones who can’t play are poor. They suffer. Let’s face it. It's all a bunch of artificial bullshit.'

Now he's on the verge of laughter, because I cursed. 

'Sure, cheer for your team if it makes you feel good. But don’t overdo it. There is something more important. Something the uniform can’t cover. Moses consoled Aaron. He didn't lecture him about G-d. Didn’t try to explain the unexplainable. He went to his brother because he was suffering.'

Then Yisroel said, 'And the Torah says Aaron responded to Moses with silence'.

And I said, ‘Sometimes there are no words. As it says in the Book of Ecclesiastes, there is a time to speak, and a time to keep silent.'

Yisroel just nodded. 

Like I said, he's the most learned of the bunch.

The Future Is Spiritual

I remember my rabbi, Ron Aigen, of blessed memory, once asking our congregation: what is spirituality? Is it God? Is it ritual? Is it tradition? Is it sacred texts? Is it a belief in certain precepts?

His answer was that it is all of these things—but something more basic. He said the essence of spirituality can be summed up in one word: connection.

Most people today don’t necessarily identify with a particular religious tradition, or even with God. And yet many still insist they are spiritual. What do they mean?

They mean that they feel a sense of connection—to the world, to other living things, to something larger than themselves. They feel part of a whole, and that feeling carries a kind of timelessness.

For most of human history, that sense of connection was expressed through religion. Religion, at its core, is a framework—a language developed to give form to the ineffable.

Some argue that religion is a path to absolute truth, and that some traditions are therefore more “correct” than others. But that strikes me as misguided. It’s like arguing that jazz is superior to reggae. These claims often reveal less about truth than about identity—tribal, cultural, ethnocentric.

All music expresses a shared range of human emotions. And all religious traditions, at their base, attempt to grapple with the same fundamental mysteries of existence.

Which brings us to a strange and telling moment: the recent circulation of an AI-generated image depicting a prominent political figure as Jesus the healer—and the backlash that followed.

The reaction was striking not because outrage is rare, but because of what triggered it. In a time saturated with provocation, vulgarity, and spectacle, something about this crossed a line—even for those otherwise tolerant of excess.

Why?

Because it touched something that still feels sacred.

Not necessarily in a strictly religious sense, but in a deeper one. It wasn’t just offensive; it felt like a violation—a boundary crossed. An unsettling fusion of ego, technology, and symbolism.

But more than that, it revealed something political.

It showed how far the logic of power has drifted into the realm of the sacred.

When a political figure is rendered as a divine healer—especially through the tools of mass digital reproduction—it is not simply satire or flattery. It is part of a broader pattern: the personalization of power, the elevation of leaders beyond institutions, and the slow erosion of the boundary between authority and reverence.

This is not new. Politics has always borrowed from religion—rituals, symbols, mythologies. But liberal democracies, at least in theory, drew a line. Leaders were meant to be temporary, accountable, replaceable. Not objects of devotion.

That line is blurring.

In an age of social media and algorithmic amplification, politics is no longer mediated primarily through institutions, but through personalities. Authority is no longer grounded in process, but in attention. Legitimacy is no longer earned through governance alone, but through spectacle.

In that environment, the transformation of a leader into a quasi-religious figure is not an accident—it is a feature.

And the public reaction—the discomfort, the backlash—suggests that people instinctively recognize the danger, even if they cannot fully articulate it.

Because when the sacred is co-opted by power, connection is replaced by submission.

And that anxiety is not emerging in a vacuum.

We are living through the aftermath of decades defined by material aspiration—by faith in endless growth, rising affluence, and personal advancement. The promise was that prosperity would deliver stability, and stability would sustain democratic norms.

But the 21st century has disrupted that faith.

The 2008 financial crisis exposed how unevenly prosperity was distributed. The pandemic revealed how fragile our systems were—and how much more vulnerable the poor were than the rich. Institutions many trusted were not simply imperfect; they were structurally tilted.

Disillusionment followed. And into that vacuum stepped a different kind of politics—less institutional, more personal; less procedural, more emotional; less about policy, more about identity and belonging.

In other words: politics began to take on the role that religion once played.

It offered meaning. It offered community. It offered a sense of participation in something larger than oneself.

But without the humility that traditionally accompanied the sacred.

At the same time, technology has transformed our sense of connection. What was once abstract is now immediate. We are linked constantly, instantly.

Now that the novelty has faded, we are beginning to ask: what does connection actually mean? Is it the frictionless consumption of content? The performance of identity? The surrender of attention to systems designed to predict and influence us?

Or is it something closer to what my rabbi described—a felt sense of belonging within a larger whole?

There are signs that a shift may be underway.

Younger generations, materially less secure than their predecessors, are not anchoring their identities in possessions as we did, but in a shared sense of vulnerability and fragility.

They are more attuned to interdependence—social, economic, environmental. But they are also navigating a world in which connection is constantly mediated, curated, and commodified.

So the tension remains.

But moments like the backlash to that image suggest something important: the capacity to recognize the sacred—however we define it—has not disappeared. It has been suppressed, distorted, redirected—but not erased.

I think about the contrast across generations. My grandfather and father were preoccupied with building stability—with putting down roots, with financial success. I was raised in material comfort, but with a sense of spiritual absence.

My children will not inherit the same material certainty. But they seem to carry something else more intuitively: a sense that they are part of something larger—and that this connection is not optional, but essential.

They understand something we are only beginning to relearn:

If the future is to be democratic, it cannot rely on material promises alone.

It must also restore a sense of the sacred—not in our leaders, but in our relationships to one another.

Joe

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My turtle is a lonely fellow,

Green with spots of red and yellow,

He moves like me, deliberate and slow,

His temperament is shy and mellow.

Thirty years I’ve watched him swim to and fro,

Seen his carapace shed many times and regrow,

Cleaned the filter so the tank water flows,

Constant as a stream he might otherwise know.

Basking on his rock in the artificial glow,

He’s too lost in thought to even nod hello,

As if he’s got some special place he has to go,

Other than this algae-coated rock, the only one he’ll ever know.

There’s so much he’ll never know:

The sound of trees when the winds blow,

The smell of wildflowers, the call of the crow,

How it feels to brumate under ice and snow.

Without exaggeration his life is shallow,

Boring as a cancelled TV show,

By the way, I call my turtle Joe,

Just one more thing he doesn’t know.

The Best Case Scenario

Putting on my political analyst’s hat again. Here’s what I’m thinking might happen.

Trump’s and Netanyahu’s boneheaded war has shown Iran that it has a nuclear option they can actually use effectively without much cost: Closure of the Straight of Hormuz.

That’s a good thing. 

Because now they don’t actually need to pursue a real nuclear weapon, which was Israel’s greatest concern. 

So Iran agrees to give up on their nuclear ambitions for some extended period of time, say twenty years (longer than Obama’s deal), and in return the US allows Iran to collect a toll from passing ships for as long as it takes them to cover reparations for the war damage that was inflicted on them.

Other issues that I cannot see being resolved in any case would be Iran’s missile capabilities or funding of proxies. Giving up the means of self defense, which is the right of every sovereign nation, is a non starter for Iran.

But I do think they might consider giving up their enriched uranium to a trusted third party. 

Hizbollah will not be part of this deal in any case. 

So Israel doesn’t get everything it wants, but crucially it gets a non nuclear Iran for the foreseeable future. 

Trump gets out of this quagmire and can declare victory because he gets a longer deal than Obama’s.

Iran has a non-nuclear ‘nuclear’ option providing a sense of regime protection, and reparations. 

This to me is a best case scenario at this stage. It sucks because the only party that truly comes out way ahead is Iran, as a revived regional power, but one that will not directly threaten Israel. 

And there’s always a chance, in the long run, that the Iranian people will tire of their hated leaders and take them down, in the natural course of events, as they might have before trump and Bibi foolishly tried to hasten the process, and instead set it back a generation.

Trump Derangement Syndrome

It was always projection.

I’m thinking of those trump supporters who spent years insisting that the people warning about his irrationality were the irrational ones—dismissing critics with the pejorative “Trump Derangement Syndrome.”

The phrase has somewhat respectable origins. In 2003, conservative commentator Charles Krauthammer coined “Bush Derangement Syndrome,” describing it as “the acute onset of paranoia in otherwise normal people” in reaction to George W. Bush. Later, another commentator David Horowitz invoked “Obama Derangement Syndrome” to criticize what he saw as over-the-top hysteria from parts of the right.

But with trump, the phrase evolved into something else entirely. Not just a critique, but a reflex—a way to deflect criticism while shielding one’s own emotional investment.

It echoes a childhood defense: if someone calls you stupid, you fire back, “I know you are, but what am I?” Or, “I’m rubber and you’re glue—whatever you say bounces off me and sticks to you.”

Admittedly, I was a sensitive kid.

And here we are, back in the schoolyard.

Now some of the loudest voices who praised trump while hurling “derangement” at his critics, are suddenly changing their tune—Tucker Carlson, Candace Owens, Alex Jones, Theo Von. Like the cowering kids who cheered on the bully, only to realize they might end up in the principal’s office along with him.

So what changed?

Was it the profanity-laced Easter message?

The image of the orange messiah as the healer Jesus?

His praising Allah after threatening to destroy an entire civilization?

Too much Epstein?

Who knows.

The explanation now offered is convenient: age, decline, something neurological—he’s not the same man he once was.

I’ve always rejected the idea that trump is suffering from dementia. That was never the issue.

What he has consistently displayed are traits associated with sociopathic, malignant narcissism: impulsiveness, grandiosity, extreme self-centeredness, and a profound lack of empathy. Those traits aren’t new.

What’s changed isn’t him—it’s the willingness, or ability, of some supporters to ignore them.

Now that those same traits are harder to overlook, and the stakes have increased with the US at war, the story shifts. Not “we misjudged him,” but “he has changed.”

It’s a more comfortable narrative. It preserves the past at the expense of the present.

Projection is a powerful thing.

The Cultural Barometer

I watched an interesting talk this weekend by David Brooks titled How America Recovers From All This. It’s worth watching—if only because it ends on an optimistic note. And we could all use a bit of that.

Still, I was left unconvinced that his optimism is entirely justified.

Brooks’ central thesis is that it is not technology, economics, or even politics that ultimately shapes society—it's culture. Politics, in his view, follows culture, which itself reflects what we collectively value. Change the values, and you can change the direction of society.

To make his case, he sketches a sweeping cultural history of postwar America. Following the mass trauma of WW2, the 1940s and 1950s, he argues, were defined by the values of humility, self-effacement, and trust—in institutions, community, and church. The 1960s were a reaction: a culture of liberation that rejected conformity in favor of authenticity, experimentation, and social upheaval. The 1970s consolidated these trends into what he calls "chaos," it was characterized by egocentrism, social fragmentation (family breakdown), distrust in institutional authority (think Watergate), personal excess and rising crime rates.

The 1980s brought a neo-conservative “bourgeois backlash”: a return to self-discipline, order, and free-market faith and excess. The decade of "Greed is Good," but also the end of the Cold War. 

The 1990s attempted a synthesis—reconciling the bohemian ethos of the 1960s with the bourgeois values of the 1980s, as the former counterculture youth had grown into the educated professional class. But by the 2000s, Brooks sees a collapse of that synthesis: not just a loss of trust in institutions, but in one another—a fraying of the social fabric and what he characterizes as a loss of moral knowledge and  ethos.

It’s an elegant narrative. But it rests on broad generalizations that raise as many questions as they answer.

Most notably: what actually drives cultural shifts?

Brooks largely sidesteps the role of anomalous major events, technologies, and personalities—factors that seem less like background noise and more like catalysts. It is difficult, for instance, to understand the 1960s without the Vietnam War, or without powerful figures like JFK and Martin Luther King Jr. Likewise, the shocks of 9/11 or the financial crisis loom large over the cultural mood of the 2000s. Today, it is impossible to ignore the impact of the Covid pandemic, social media and the advent of artificial intelligence.

If anything, the forces he identifies as symptomatic of the age, act more like the engines of change. To my mind there is a complex interplay between politics, economics, social phenomena and unforeseaable events that shape our times. Culture does not determine where we are—it expresses it.

There was one part of Brooks’ talk that resonated with me. His discussion of humiliation as a driver of political behavior. Humiliation, as he defines it, is the sense of being denied the dignity or status one believes they deserve. It is a powerful emotional force—one that can easily turn into resentment and hatred.

That dynamic is clearly visible in contemporary American politics. The rise of trump tapped into something real. The anger, the intolerance, the sense of grievance—these are not inventions. They are expressions of lived experience, however distorted and politicized.

Where I part ways with Brooks is in his faith that we will naturally gravitate back toward higher values—that we will tire of division and rediscover meaning, justice, and humanism.

Perhaps. But it is far from clear why or how that turn would occur.

If anything, our culture today seems to reflect something else: disconnection, narcissism, and a certain emptiness. Much of popular music feels repetitive and inward-looking. Increasingly, it is even generated or shaped by AI. The broader cultural landscape often feels less like a shared conversation and more like a fragmented echo chamber.

Brooks believes that most people instinctively understand that a life of meaning is more valuable than one devoted to pleasure. That may be true in the abstract. But it sits uneasily alongside what our culture actually rewards and amplifies.

It is entirely possible that we break the cycle, as he suggests. But it is just as plausible that we continue down a different path—one in which technology, especially AI, further erodes agency, deepens isolation, and amplifies cynicism.

If Brooks is accurate that the cycles we experience tend to swing from a decade of change to a decade of consolidation and back, then the worrisome social and political trend of the last decade may well consolidate in the next one. 

That would take us further from pursuing the humanistic 'higher values' that he predicts than ever, and there is no telling where that takes us.  

American Exceptionalism

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I heard the term my whole life

and wondered, 

what's that all about?

I knew

a few things: Elvis, 

The Supremes, 

Charlie Parker and Monk, 

the Beach Boys and Jimi Hendrix,

the Yankees vs. the Dodgers,

Ali vs. Frazier,

the lights of Times Square 

and the Hollywood sign,

Gilligan's Island and The Beverly Hillbillies, 

Laugh-In and Carol Burnett,

The Love Boat, Charlie's Angels,

and Fantasy Island,

Clint Eastwood as Dirty Harry

and Luke Skywalker:

One small step for a man...

JFK, RFK, MLK and Vietnam,

D-Day,

The Bomb,

and the Marshall Plan;

a decision not to humiliate 

the defeated

but instead

to invest in them -

for the first time in history

someone understood,

together 

we live in freedom

or die in chains,

it was called 

American Exceptionalism

and it belonged 

to all of us.

Facing The Reality of Israel's Project

This post was inspired by an important recent discussion on the Ezra Klein show. Highly recommended.

Many of us staunchly supported Israel's right to defend itself after the attack of October 7th 2023. 

It's now clear that the current Israeli government has chosen to leverage its response to October 7th to launch another project: The one state solution.

A decision - intially implicit but now largely explicit - was made to not just destroy Gaza in every functional way to make it unlivable, but also to kill the Oslo Peace process once and for all. This means an effort to render the Palestinian Authority completely ineffectual and to annex the West Bank by building settler communities at a rate that would make any hope of a Palestinian State impossible.

From 2020 to 2023 no new Jewish settlements in the West Bank were approved by the Israeli government. In 2023 nine new settlements were approved. In 2024 it was five. In 2025 the number is fifty-four. 

This has deep roots. Netanyahu has been laser focused throughout his political career on two main goals. The first was to eliminate the terrorism that has plagued Israel. The second was to eliminate the nuclear threat from Iran. 

The terrorism came in two forms: Palestinian terrorism that emanated from the West Bank, and Iran-backed proxy terrorism that came from Hizbollah based in Lebanon and Hamas based in Gaza.

Netanyahu viewed the post-October 7th response as a strategic opportunity to advance his long-term agenda. Trump’s reelection provided the final tool—total military carte blanche with U.S. backing—and that is what we are now witnessing.

He could now, not merely attempt to set back the threat of Iran's proxies (the so-called Axis of Resistance) and their nuclear program, but equally important (and much less discussed) end the two-state solution. 

Which begs the question: Assuming Netanyahu is successful in his military objectives, where does that leave Israel with respect to the Palestinians?  

There seems to be only two possibilities: 

1. The West Bank and Gaza are formally annexed and the Palestinians become full citizens of Israel. Any Palestinians who don't want Israeli citizenship will either leave voluntarily and/or be forcibly expelled. 

It seems pretty clear that the Palestinians won't want this result under any circumstance and won't ever accept it. Israelis won't want it either because it would threaten the Jewish majority.

2. The West Bank and Gaza are controlled but not legally annexed and the Palestinians are subjugated permanently.

In other words, ethnic cleansing or apartheid.

The unworkability of this situation is one thing. The immorality and illegality is another. In either case, it puts Israel in a terrible bind both domestically and internationally. 

Previous Israeli governments made it a policy to remain non-partisan as far as the United States is concerned. Netanyahu tied Israel inextricably to trump, which was a risky move that offered short term benefits but other dangers. 

Those chickens are already coming home to roost. We are seeing Israel's support in the US plummet to historical lows, even among the 'America First' evangelicals.  

So what is the endgame?

At best: Israel secures a period of dominance, under conditions of simmering resistance, growing international isolation, and deepening moral compromise.

Whatever this is—it isn’t a just peace.

Trust

I was recently watching a YouTube video from Big Think featuring the philosopher Alain de Botton.

De Botton became widely known for his essay "Why You Will Marry the Wrong Person", which resonated because it dismantles a comforting but damaging myth: that we can find a perfect partner and live happily ever after. We can’t. Every relationship contains difficulty, friction, and disappointment. And that’s not failure—it’s reality.

Compatibility, as De Botton puts it, isn’t something you find. It’s something you build. It is the fruit of love, not its prerequisite.

In the video, he returns to familiar ground, but what stood out to me was the idea of trust—what it is, and where it actually lives.

I think there are two kinds of trust: helpful trust and unhelpful trust.

At the heart of both is a simple truth: no one is 100% trustworthy in every circumstance. We are all imperfect, inconsistent, and shaped by forces we don’t fully control. Some people are more trustworthy than others, of course—but perfection is not on offer.

Helpful trust begins with oneself. It’s grounded in self-awareness and accountability. It asks: "Am I acting in a way that aligns with my values? Can I rely on myself to respond honestly, to repair when I fail, to leave if I must?" This kind of trust is aspirational without being harsh. It is steady, reflective, and rooted in growth.

Unhelpful trust, by contrast, is rooted in expectation of others. It quietly assumes that another person will behave as we need them to. It is less about trust and more about control—about outsourcing our sense of safety to someone else’s consistency. And because no one can meet that standard indefinitely, it often leads to frustration, disappointment, and eventually resentment.

This doesn’t mean we shouldn’t expect anything from our partners. Of course we should. Honesty, loyalty, and care are the basic conditions of any relationship. But there is a difference between expectations that guide us, and expectations that attempt to control what we cannot.

No one can ever be certain that another person is trustworthy. At best, we make a judgment based on patterns over time. Trust, in that sense, is always a kind of informed risk. It's trust in our ability to acknowledge and accept reality.

Which is why the real work of trust is self-work.

When we feel disappointment in a relationship, part of that feeling may indeed be directed outward—at something real that the other person has done. But a bigger component, I believe, turns inward as well. It confronts us with our own limitations: our misjudgments, our fears, our unwillingness to see things clearly.

That tension is uncomfortable. And it’s often easier to convert that discomfort into resentment toward the other person than to examine what it reveals about ourselves.

The message I think is to place our emotional energy where we have agency.

There are no guarantees in relationships. Being honest, loyal, generous, and loving does not ensure that your partner will be the same. But the inverse is almost certain—if you are not those things, the relationship will not hold.

Trust, then, is not the elimination of risk. It is the cultivation of self-reliance within risk.

The more confident you are in your own trustworthiness—in your ability to act with integrity, to recognize reality, and to respond accordingly—the less fragile your relationships become.

Not because others will never fail you.

But because you won’t fail yourself.

The Breathing Pattern of Politics

Politics is often described as a pendulum swinging between left and right, progressivism and conservatism. But that familiar spectrum feels inadequate to explain the moment we’re living in. The deeper oscillation may not be ideological at all. It may be civilizational.

What if politics doesn’t fundamentally swing between left and right—but between 'inclusion' and 'exclusion', between openness and closeness?

This framing shifts the question from “How should society be organized?” to something more primal: "Who belongs and who doesn’t?"

Periods of inclusion are marked by expanding boundaries. Immigration rises, trade flows more freely, cultures intermingle, and institutions assume that difference can be integrated without breaking the whole. These are times of confidence—when societies feel stable enough to absorb complexity.

Periods of exclusion move in the opposite direction. Boundaries harden. Membership narrows. National identity becomes more sharply defined. The priority shifts from expansion to cohesion, from openness to protection. These are times when societies feel under strain and begin to question how much difference they can sustain.

After the devastation of World War II, much of the world moved decisively toward openness—building international institutions, lowering trade barriers, and promoting universal rights. That trajectory accelerated after the Cold War, culminating in a high point of globalization where borders softened and integration deepened.

But openness, when extended far enough, begins to generate its own tensions—economic dislocation, cultural anxiety, and a sense of loss of control. In response, the pendulum swings back. The past few decades have been defined by this reversal: a turn toward rigidity of borders, identity, and sovereignty.

This helps explain why traditional political categories feel scrambled. Figures like trump do not fit neatly into conventional ideological boxes. Their defining characteristic is not a consistent economic philosophy, but a clear orientation toward closure—restricting borders, renegotiating trade, and redefining who is and who should not be included within the national community.

Importantly, neither pole is inherently virtuous. Excessive openness can erode shared identity and create instability. Excessive closure can harden into authoritarianism and conflict. 

The movement between them is not simply a battle of good versus bad ideas—it is a recurring attempt to rebalance competing needs: expansion and cohesion, diversity and unity.

Rather than a straight line, politics may be better understood as a kind of 'breathing pattern'. Societies inhale—expanding, including, absorbing. Then they exhale—consolidating, defining, protecting.

The critical question is not whether the cycle exists, but whether they are short or long, and what drives their turning points. Are these shifts inevitable responses to material pressures like economic disruption and migration? Or are they shaped—and perhaps accelerated—by narratives, leadership, and perception?

If the latter is true, then the pendulum is not just something we experience. It is something that can be pushed and we can influence. 

Donnie Two Weeks

I think I first heard the nickname sometime last summer. “Donnie Two Weeks.”

It came up when trump was threatening tariffs against just about every country on the planet. The pattern was always the same: a deal had to be reached in two weeks. And when the deadline inevitably passed, it was extended—by another two weeks.

And now, here we are again. Another two-week deadline. This time for a ceasefire and a deal with Iran. Make a deal, or face destruction.

A President of the United States has never talked like this. Like a mafia boss. It’s the language of a protection racket. I’m giving you two weeks. Pay up—or else.

There’s a reason Presidents never talked like this. Political messaging is meaningful and layered. Agreements between countries are complicated. They take time, patience, and sustained negotiation. Nothing meaningful in international diplomacy happens in two weeks.

According to Wendy Sherman, the Deputy Secretary of State under Obama who helped negotiate the Iran nuclear deal, it took eighteen months to reach an agreement. 

So when another two-week deadline gets announced, you already know what’s coming. Not a deal. Just another extension.

But the nickname is so apt for another reason. Trump thinks like a mafioso.

Loyalty matters more than competence or rule of law. Relationships are personal not institutional. Power is territorial. And everything eventually comes down to making money.

Look at how he talks about countries. About “running” places.

Think of the Venezuela operation. It’s hard not to see it as one operator muscling out another—Nicolás Maduro replaced, territory absorbed, assets controlled.

Or take his response to a question from reporter Jonathan Karl about the Strait of Hormuz. When he was asked if he would accept Iran charging tolls on global shipping, trump answered that he was considering "a joint venture."

We get our cut. They get theirs. "It’s a beautiful thing,” he said. You can almost hear the mobster-accent.

Vladimir Putin runs a a mafia state—leveraging the power of government to skim his cut off the top of every transaction. Donnie Two Weeks wishes he could do the same. 

So, every time he threatens 'two weeks' think of it that way.

A Whole Civilization Dies

There is a new question circulating in my mind on the day trump announced that he will be ordering his military to kill an ancient civilization, in his words: "A whole civilization will die tonight, never to be brought back again."

Will the members of the military willingly participate in an unambiguous, self-admitted war crime?

And if they do, will there be military tribunals in the United States and/or war crime trials in the Hague to hold the perpetrators accountable?  

And a somewhat related question: What has become of America when the terrorist-supporting, theocratic autocracy of Iran seems like the reasonable party to a conflict? 

Trump has backed himself into a corner. Basically made an exaggerated impossible threat that just shows how panicked he is. 

My guess is that he'll extend the deadline again, saying there are 'very good' fictitious negotiations going on. Or do a little more bombing and say the job is done.     

But let's say I'm wrong - it wouldn't be the first time - and he goes through with a Dresdan-style bombing campaign of Iranian infrastructure.   

The one thing we know about trump is that he is nothing if not narcissistically, dementedly, transparent. He thinks out loud through his social media posts. Almost everything he says publicly is projection. 

When he says the Democrats are trying to steal the election it's because he is.

When he says the Democrats are weaponizing the Department of Justice against him it's because he is weaponizing it against them.

When he calls something 'fake news' it's because he is lying about it.

So there is always truth to what he's saying, it's just the exact opposite.

We may be able to add to the list, "a whole civilization will die tonight" - he's not talking about Iran, he's talking about America.   

April 6, 2026

“…We will explore, we will build... but — ultimately — we will always choose Earth. We will always choose each other.”

- Artemis Astronaut Christina Koch’s words when reconnecting with Earth after 40 minutes without communication on the far side of the moon.


"We have a plan, because of the power of our military, where every bridge in Iran will be decimated by 12 o'clock tomorrow night…Power plants in Iran will be burning, exploding and never to be used again."

- Donald J. Trump at a White House press conference.

Is This Another Suez Moment?

History doesn’t repeat, but it does rhyme.

I keep seeing parallels in recent events with another moment: the Suez Crisis.

A quick refresher.

On July 26, 1956, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company, a joint British-French enterprise that had operated the canal since 1869.

Nasser made the move in direct response to the United States and Great Britain withdrawing financial support for the Aswan High Dam. His plan was simple: use canal tolls to fund its construction.

Fearing for their oil supply and strategic position, Britain and France formed a secret alliance with Israel to retake the canal by force.

In October 1956, Israel invaded the Sinai Peninsula, providing a pretext for British and French forces to intervene as “peacekeepers” and occupy the Canal Zone.

Militarily, the operation was largely successful. Politically, it was a disaster.

Egypt blocked the canal by sinking ships. The international community reacted with immediate and severe condemnation. U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, furious at the deception, threatened Britain with economic sanctions and a run on the pound. At the same time, the Soviet Union threatened intervention, raising the specter of a wider war within the broader context of the Cold War.

The United Nations deployed its first-ever peacekeeping force. By March 1957, foreign troops withdrew, and the canal reopened under Egyptian control.

The outcome was decisive. Nasser emerged as a hero of Arab nationalism, and the crisis marked the end of British and French imperial dominance in the Middle East.

Now consider the present.

In this scenario, it’s not Suez but the Strait of Hormuz. Egypt is replaced by Iran. And instead of Britain and France acting alongside Israel, it is the United States. Russia, in turn, plays a role analogous to the Soviet Union. The United Nations, this time, appears diminished—unable to exert meaningful influence.

In 1956, the United States acted as a restraining force on its allies. Today, it is a principal actor. Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Qatar are sovereign, wealthy, and deeply integrated into global markets with everything at stake.

Imagine the outcome.

Iran establishes a de facto toll system in the Strait, allowing passage to its own vessels and those willing to pay. After a period of escalation, the United States—seeking to avoid a wider war—unilaterally ends hostilities.

Iran then declares the toll permanent, framing it as both sovereign right and reparations for wartime damage.

What do the Gulf states do?

Publicly, they would reject it outright. Freedom of navigation is not an abstract principle for them; it is the foundation of their economic survival. Accepting such a regime would signal weakness and erode sovereignty.

My guess is they would comply, quietly, to keep oil and gas flowing—especially Qatar, whose exports depend heavily on that passage. The result would be a dual reality: formal opposition paired with practical accommodation.

More significantly, they would begin to rebalance their strategic relationships.

If the United States proves unwilling or unable to guarantee open passage, confidence in its security umbrella weakens. That doesn’t mean abandonment—but it does mean diversification. Ties with China and Russia deepen, not as replacements, but as hedges.

And perhaps most quietly, they would explore accommodation with Iran itself.

If Iran emerges from such a confrontation appearing resilient—or even victorious—the incentive shifts toward de-escalation. Diplomatic channels reopen. A tacit equilibrium forms.

Because for these states, the priority is not ideological victory. It is survival.

This is where the historical rhyme is strongest.

In 1956, Britain and France achieved their military objectives but suffered a lasting political defeat. Nasser, despite battlefield setbacks, emerged stronger.

In this scenario, Iran would not need a decisive military victory to claim success. Endurance alone—combined with the perception of having stood up to the United States—could be enough.

And that perception would reshape the region, and in the process power relationships around the world.

Stephen Lewis (1937-2026)

You can’t script it in a more touching way.

Stephen Lewis was gravely ill in hospice on Sunday when he watched on television his son Avi Lewis win the leadership of the federal New Democratic Party. He passed away two days later at the age of 88.

Lewis served as an elected member of the Ontario legislature and later as leader of the provincial NDP. But most of his public life was spent in other roles: as a special advisor on race relations in Ontario, Canada’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Deputy Director of UNICEF, and United Nations Special Envoy for HIV/AIDS in Africa.

I don’t think I ever voted for a New Democrat. But I always had a great deal of respect for Stephen Lewis—as a bridge builder, a humanitarian, and a statesman. He was respected across party lines, and, in my lifetime, one of the most thoughtful and articulate voices of Canadian values on both the national and international stage.

He was also heir to a Jewish dynasty in Canadian public life—one his son now carries forward. Stephen’s father, David Lewis, was a key figure in the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, the forerunner to the NDP, and later served as federal NDP leader (1971–75), succeeding the party’s legendary founder Tommy Douglas, to whom we owe medicare.

The roots of the Lewis family’s political activism in Canada lie in the Jewish Labour Bund, the secular trade union and workers’ rights movement of Eastern Europe in the late 19th century.

When I mentioned David Lewis to my wife the other day, she said, “Oh—you mean the street.” Yes, there is a Rue David Lewis in Côte Saint-Luc. I chuckled, wondering how many people who live on that street know anything about the man it was named after. My guess is not many.

And I wonder how many supporters of the NDP across Canada—currently forming governments in British Columbia and Manitoba, and serving as Official Opposition in Alberta, Saskatchewan, Ontario, Nova Scotia, and Yukon—know that the party’s origins lie, in significant part, in the Jewish labour and social justice movement.

Israel - We need to have a word

You know how a true friend is one who is candid? They tell you the truth even when you may not want to hear it.

Israel. I love you. But we have to talk.

It seems you have a new law—a death penalty law. Death by hanging; which feels particularly archaic and barbaric. It brings to mind the gallows of the old west, the Nuremberg trials, even the Book of Esther.

I suppose I should be thankful stoning wasn’t chosen.

Admittedly, Jews have a history with the death penalty.

The Torah prescribes it for 36 offenses, including murder, kidnapping, and severe religious violations like idolatry and breaking the Sabbath.

However, the rabbis of the Talmud sharply restricted its use. The Mishnah teaches that a court that executes once in seventy years is considered “destructive.”

And of course there is the principle associated with Maimonides: better to acquit a thousand guilty people than to put a single innocent one to death.

For this reason, for many centuries, Jews have not been enthusiastic about capital punishment.

Modern Jewish movements—Conservative and Reform—have explicitly opposed it. Orthodox Judaism has never embraced it in practice either.

As for the modern State of Israel, capital punishment has been carried out only once, in the case of Adolf Eichmann.

Until now.

Because this proposed law is not exactly for Israelis. More for Palestinians. Not exactly for crimes inside Israel proper, but in the West Bank.

It targets terrorism: a person who intentionally causes death with the aim of harming a citizen or resident of Israel, and with the intent of rejecting the existence of the state.

The law outlines two tracks: one in Israeli civilian courts, and another in military courts in the West Bank—courts that try Palestinians under military law.

In that system, the sentence could become mandatory: death, and that penalty only.

So not only would a mandatory death sentence be new in Israeli law, it would, in practice, apply almost exclusively to Palestinians.

There is a term for when one law applies to one group and another to a different group: two-tiered justice. A less polite word is discrimination.

History offers examples of such systems. None are remembered kindly. And Israel has long resisted being associated with such comparisons—for good reason.

You might think discrimination only cuts one way. It doesn’t. It's said we've lost the war when we become our enemy's image of us.

I remember learning that, in its time, the Torah was relatively progressive in its treatment of the stranger—precisely because Israel knew what it meant to be one.

“You are to have the same law for the foreigner and the native-born.” (Leviticus 24:22)

On this day, Passover eve, it bears remembering.

The Israelites were subject to a different law than their taskmasters in Egypt.

It did not end well for Egypt.