Is This Another Suez Moment?

History doesn’t repeat, but it does rhyme.

I keep seeing parallels in recent events with another moment: the Suez Crisis.

A quick refresher.

On July 26, 1956, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company, a joint British-French enterprise that had operated the canal since 1869.

Nasser made the move in direct response to the United States and Great Britain withdrawing financial support for the Aswan High Dam. His plan was simple: use canal tolls to fund its construction.

Fearing for their oil supply and strategic position, Britain and France formed a secret alliance with Israel to retake the canal by force.

In October 1956, Israel invaded the Sinai Peninsula, providing a pretext for British and French forces to intervene as “peacekeepers” and occupy the Canal Zone.

Militarily, the operation was largely successful. Politically, it was a disaster.

Egypt blocked the canal by sinking ships. The international community reacted with immediate and severe condemnation. U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, furious at the deception, threatened Britain with economic sanctions and a run on the pound. At the same time, the Soviet Union threatened intervention, raising the specter of a wider war within the broader context of the Cold War.

The United Nations deployed its first-ever peacekeeping force. By March 1957, foreign troops withdrew, and the canal reopened under Egyptian control.

The outcome was decisive. Nasser emerged as a hero of Arab nationalism, and the crisis marked the end of British and French imperial dominance in the Middle East.

Now consider the present.

In this scenario, it’s not Suez but the Strait of Hormuz. Egypt is replaced by Iran. And instead of Britain and France acting alongside Israel, it is the United States. Russia, in turn, plays a role analogous to the Soviet Union. The United Nations, this time, appears diminished—unable to exert meaningful influence.

In 1956, the United States acted as a restraining force on its allies. Today, it is a principal actor. Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Qatar are sovereign, wealthy, and deeply integrated into global markets with everything at stake.

Imagine the outcome.

Iran establishes a de facto toll system in the Strait, allowing passage to its own vessels and those willing to pay. After a period of escalation, the United States—seeking to avoid a wider war—unilaterally ends hostilities.

Iran then declares the toll permanent, framing it as both sovereign right and reparations for wartime damage.

What do the Gulf states do?

Publicly, they would reject it outright. Freedom of navigation is not an abstract principle for them; it is the foundation of their economic survival. Accepting such a regime would signal weakness and erode sovereignty.

My guess is they would comply, quietly, to keep oil and gas flowing—especially Qatar, whose exports depend heavily on that passage. The result would be a dual reality: formal opposition paired with practical accommodation.

More significantly, they would begin to rebalance their strategic relationships.

If the United States proves unwilling or unable to guarantee open passage, confidence in its security umbrella weakens. That doesn’t mean abandonment—but it does mean diversification. Ties with China and Russia deepen, not as replacements, but as hedges.

And perhaps most quietly, they would explore accommodation with Iran itself.

If Iran emerges from such a confrontation appearing resilient—or even victorious—the incentive shifts toward de-escalation. Diplomatic channels reopen. A tacit equilibrium forms.

Because for these states, the priority is not ideological victory. It is survival.

This is where the historical rhyme is strongest.

In 1956, Britain and France achieved their military objectives but suffered a lasting political defeat. Nasser, despite battlefield setbacks, emerged stronger.

In this scenario, Iran would not need a decisive military victory to claim success. Endurance alone—combined with the perception of having stood up to the United States—could be enough.

And that perception would reshape the region, and in the process power relationships around the world.