Thinking A Position Through

I’ve been hearing this a lot: “I’m glad Khamenei is gone. So I support the war.”

In a nutshell, that’s what Mark Carney suggested in his initial public statement — one he has since tried to walk back, or at least qualify, by calling the war “regrettable” and "inconsistent with international law."

Regrettable, indeed.

The statement “Khamenei and his terrible regime needed to go, therefore I support the war” is known in the parlance as a non sequitur.

It does not necessarily follow that because you are pleased with a result, you must also approve of the way it came about.

Imagine you’re walking down the street and find a $20 bill on the sidewalk. Lucky day. You’re $20 richer. But that same $20 was clearly dropped by someone else. You can be happy about your gain without celebrating the misfortune that produced it.

So yes — one can be relieved that Khamenei is gone. But that does not oblige anyone to endorse the means that brought it about.

Even if you oppose the terrorism-sponsoring leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran — as most of us do — the action taken by the United States that led to this outcome must also be evaluated on its own terms. Here is the logic:

1. Khamenei and his repressive, criminal regime were undeniably harmful — to the Iranian people and to global stability.

2. Therefore, the world is better off without them.

3. A central reason the Iranian regime was so destabilizing is that it ignored and actively undermined the rules-based international system by sponsoring and spreading terror and violence.

4. Therefore, if the justification for removing them is to preserve international stability and curb terrorism, the action taken must itself respect the norms and conventions of the rules-based international order.

5. The unilateral action of the United States — outside clear international legal authorization — further undermines those same norms and conventions.

In other words, the ends do not justify the means.

In fact, the means may do greater long-term harm than the instability they seek to eliminate.

And the end itself is uncertain. There is no way to predict what follows the assassination of a leader and the decapitation of a regime. Power vacuums do not produce order; they produce struggle. The only certainty is instability.

Add to that the human cost of war, the damage inflicted, and the further erosion of the legal and normative framework that has structured international relations since the end of World War II, and the conclusion becomes clear:

One may oppose the Iranian regime and still condemn the reckless manner in which it was removed.

If the justification for war is the defense of international order, then violating that order to achieve it is self-defeating.

And that is precisely why the war must be opposed.